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Using brand level retail data, the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks is shown to 
be an outcome of the degree to which firms have placed brands effectively (store coverage) 
across vertical (flavour, packaging, diet attributes) segments of the market. Regularity in the 
firm size distribution is not disturbed by the nature of short-run brand competition (turbulence 
in brand market shares) within segments. Remarkably, product differentiation resulting from 
firms acquiring various portfolios of product attributes and stores in market evolution 
determines the limiting firm size distribution.  
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Introduction 
 Economists have long been consumed by the desire to identify and understand the 
mechanisms driving firm size distributions. The literature before Sutton (1998) left us with a 
legacy that failed to generalise on a form of firm size distribution.
1 Sutton (1998) provides us 
with a new empirical approach.
2 Rather than looking for an exact size distribution, he derives a 
lower bound to firm size distribution  that will hold in any industry where firms operate over 
segments that have emerged in the history of the market
3. The lower bound is a limiting outcome 
driven by a sequence of deterministic entry games across the segments of the market. 
Theoretically, differences in firm coverage of segments override the details of events within 
segments in determining the limiting size distribution.  
To date the empirical validation of this theory defines segments in terms of geographic 
location in the US Cement Industry (Sutton, 1998), the Spanish Retail Banking Sector (De Juan, 
1999) and the Italian Motor Insurance Industry (Buzzacchi and Valletti, 1999).  These industries 
host a homogenous product line. The lower bound to firm size distribution at the national level is 
not violated in any of these studies. In the case of the US Cement Industry, we observe firms of 
similar size within each State. The inequality at the national level is mainly determined by the 
varying presence of firms across geographical locations
4. To be a large firm at the national level 
requires a presence over many States. This point was also shown for Retail Banking and Motor 
Insurance. As predicted by Sutton’s (1998) theory, the degree of coverage (portfolios) of 
geographical locations by firms can by itself explain most of the observed differences in firm 
size at the national level. 
Using the Sutton (1998) framework we model the firm size distribution in Carbonated 
Soft Drinks in the Irish retail market using AC Nielsen data on the population of 178 brands 
belonging to 13 firms operating over 40 product characteristics and 27 bi-monthly periods, 1992-
1997.  The retail market for Carbonated Soft Drinks in Ireland is broadly similar to the U.S. 
There are differences between Ireland and the US that are typical of European Carbonated Soft 
Drinks markets [see Sutton (1991)]. These differences are highlighted in our data section. 
Companies in the business of Carbonated Soft Drinks produce products defined by various 
flavour, packaging and diet attributes. To allow for flavour segments (Cola, Orange, Lemonade 
and Mixed Fruit) is standard in the analysis of Carbonated Soft Drinks [see Sutton (1991) and 
Dubé (2000)].  Moreover, Dubé (2000), using household data to estimate the short-run impact of   2
soft drink mergers, highlights the need to define product attributes further by nutritional content 
and packaging size.  
Sutton (1998) predicts that market segmentation and heterogeneous operations over such 
segments by firms imposes a limiting lower bound to firm size distribution, or a minimum 
degree of inequality that will generate a Gini co-efficient of at least 0.5. We are the first to 
provide an empirical validation of the Sutton (1998) bounds approach using counts (portfolios) 
of vertical segments as a key determinant of firm size, where forty market segments are defined 
by different combination of flavour, packaging and diet attributes
5. Measuring firm size based 
solely on portfolios of product attributes, for example a firm has a size of ten if it has at least one 
brand in ten segments, generates a firm size distribution above the mathematically predicted 
lower bound. The Lorenz-curve analysis for every bi-monthly period is supplemented with an 
econometric model of firm size. The results show us that company coverage of market segments, 
amongst other factors, has great explanatory power and induces significant regularity in the firm 
size distribution over the period 1992-1997. 
A count on product attributes assumes that all firm sales are the same within and across 
the segments of the market. Differences in the intensity of short-run price competition within 
segments will not lead to violations of the lower bound, but is shown theoretically to push the 
size distribution further inside the bound. Our data allows us to test this proposition. We extend 
the Lorenz-curve analysis and the econometric model of firm size by weighting a presence in a 
vertical (product) attribute by horizontal (store) coverage within a segment. For example, if shop 
coverage by a firm within a segment is only fifty per cent of the store population, rather than 
attributing one to firm size due to having a presence in a defined segment we attribute 0.5. Once 
can also weight store coverage in terms of the size of the store in Carbonated Soft Drinks 
turnover. This gives us an analysis of effective firm coverage of market segments. In other words, 
we allow for different portfolios of stores (generating varying degrees of horizontal product 
differentiation) within segments. Firm size measured on the basis of  effective  coverage of 
product segments not only pushes the size distribution further inside Sutton’s (1998) 
mathematically predicted lower bound, but also explains most of the actual firm size distribution. 
In the history of the market firms accumulate various portfolios of product attributes and stores, 
as an outcome of many strategic entry games. Remarkably, the structure of how firms operate 
over such vertical and horizontal dimensions of the Carbonated Soft Drinks market determines 
the limiting firm size distribution.  
Finally, to understand how brand market share turbulence within segments will not lead 
to violations of the lower bound or indeed disturb the regularity in the firm size distribution in   3
Carbonated Soft Drinks we test a final assertion of Sutton’s theoretically framework. Theory 
shows that competition can generate within segment size distributions of various forms. If 
segmentation exists and firms have heterogeneous operations over these segments, then any 
changes in firm sales within segments will only have second order effects on the aggregate 
inequality and will not lead to violations of the lower bound. We show that short-run brand 
market share rivalry is localised within our product segments, and within segment competition is 
augmented by the nature of store coverage by brands. The nature of product differentiation on 
two dimensions is shown to dictate and constrain the nature of competition between brands. Size 
distributions of firm sales within product segments take on many forms and vary over-time. Yet, 
the details of within segment sales activity do not override the effect that heterogeneous coverage 
of segments by firms has on the firm size distribution at the level of Carbonated Soft Drinks.  
Remarkably, product differentiation resulting from firms acquiring various portfolios 
of stores and product attributes in market evolution determines the limiting firm size 
distribution. So while the Coca-Cola Company has on average 52 per cent of the Carbonated 
Soft Drinks retail market in Ireland over the period 1992 to 1997, its dominance does not 
result from its performance in the Cola market. Rather, its success lies in the establishment of 
a portfolio of brands across 91 per cent of the vertical segments with an effective (weighted 
by store coverage within segments) coverage of 58 per cent.  Smaller firms operate alongside 
the multinationals by specialising into various vertical and horizontal segments of the market. 
The nature of product differentiation is shown to have important implications for anti-trust 
work.  
I. Data Description 
AC Nielsen, an international marketing research company, has collated a panel database 
of all brands in Carbonated Soft Drinks distributed throughout Irish retail stores for use in our 
empirical analysis. The evolution of the Irish retail grocery market structure from the early 1970s 
is described in Walsh and Whelan (1999a). Unlike the UK retail market for Carbonated Drinks 
“own brands” are not a feature of the Irish Market. The retail market for Carbonated Soft Drinks 
in Ireland is broadly similar to the U.S. We have a similar style of chain stores and corner shops 
and a heavily branded market. In 1997, the top two firms collectively account for 73 per cent of 
the Irish market and 75 per cent of the US retail market. Inequality in retail sales as measured by 
the Gini co-efficient is 0.72 in Ireland and 0.68 in the US. There are differences between Ireland 
and the US that are typical of European Carbonated Soft Drinks markets. These differences are 
highlighted in case studies of several countries in Sutton (1991). The Cola segment of the market   4
is 35 to 40 per cent in Europe, compared to 63 per cent in the US. While Pepsi has a smaller 
share of the Cola segment in Europe, it is merged with 7-UP outside the US. The nature of 
bottling is not fully integrated in Europe allowing smaller firms to co-exist with the 
multinationals. Finally, while flavour segments are similar to the US in Ireland, Root Beer and 
Dr. Pepper type brands never took off.    
The database provides bi-monthly population data spanning October 1992 to March 1997 
for 178 brands, identified for 13 firms and 40 product characteristics within the particular 
“business” of Carbonated Soft Drinks
6. The data record the retail activities of both Irish and 
foreign owned brands/firms selling throughout the stores of the Irish retail sector
7. We are bound 
by a contract of confidentiality with AC Nielsen not to reveal information not otherwise 
available on the market. We have extensive bi-monthly brand level information regarding 
information on brand price (average of individual brand prices across all stores selling the brand 
weighted by brand sales share within the store), quantity (in ml), sales value (in £000), 
distribution structure (number and size of the s tores through which the brand retails), firm 
attachment and their vertical (flavour, packaging, and diet) characteristics. An interesting feature 
of the AC Nielsen data is their identification of various segments within the market for 
Carbonated Soft Drinks, which group clusters of brands by 40 characteristics: 4 flavours (Cola, 
Orange, Lemonade and Mixed Fruit), 5 different packaging types (Cans, Standard Bottle, 1.5 
Litre, 2 Litre and Multi-Pack of Cans) and 2 different sweeteners, diet and regular. Packaging 
format is recognised as a crucial feature of this market. Over 90 per cent of cans and standard 
bottles are impulse buys distributed through small corner stores and garage forecourts rather than 
chain stores. In contrast, the majority of 2 litre and multi-pack cans are distributed through one-
stop supermarket shopping. The industry has clearly introduced different packaging to satisfy 
different consumer needs within both the impulse and one-stop shopping segments (Walsh and 
Whelan, 1999a).  
We define the firm business as Carbonated Soft Drinks, but within this market firms 
place brands, or take-up roles, across various segments of the market. So if a firm operates in all 
segments, it has adopted 40 different roles. Details of the segments and associated number of 
firm roles and brands they host are set out in Table 1. Interestingly there are only 100 roles taken 
up, on average, by the 13 firms. If every firm operated in every segment we would have 13 firms 
in each of the 40 segments giving a total of 520 roles. There is a very heterogeneous and a 
persistent pattern in the take up of roles by firms across vertical segments. This will be shown to 
be a key structural feature of the industry, particularly when weighted by the coverage of stores 
within segments, in the determination of the limiting firm size distribution.   5
II. Theoretical Framework 
A market is made up of segments that host at least one investment opportunity. The key 
structural feature of Sutton’s (1998) theory is the arrival of a number of discrete investment 
opportunities over an infinite period in the history of the market. Assuming opportunities of 
equal size arrive and are taken up by a firm, the market begins with a single firm of size 1. Each 
subsequent opportunity is taken up by either a new firm or existing firm. If opportunities were 
taken up by a succession by new firms, the resultant limiting size distribution will display perfect 
equality between firms of size 1. Differences in firm sizes emerge when firms have taken up a 
different number of opportunities across the segments of the market. Sutton (1998) puts weak 
restrictions on the form of the entry game into segments that host investment opportunities to 
model a lower bound on the size distribution of firms in a market. A symmetric equilibrium in 
mixed strategies can be calculated where each firm has an equal probability of entering a 
segment to take up an opportunity and therefore have ‘equal treatment’. By imposing a 
symmetry requirement on the strategy space of each subgame, all equilibria are excluded except 
this mixed strategy equilibrium. Sutton (1998) derives his lower bound within a game-theoretic 
model using this Symmetry Principle when modelling deterministic entry processes across the 
segments of the market.
8  
Firm size is simply equal to the total number of segments over which they operate. Firm 
size distribution, based on a simple count of segments, is restricted to a lower bound Lorenz 
curve. The limiting Lorenz curve graphs the fraction of top k ranking firms in the population N 
of firms, k/N, against their corresponding market share, given by the k-firm concentration ratio, 





k C ln 1- ‡                         (1) 
Segmentation and heterogeneous participation of firms across segments dictates a lower 
bound to firm size distribution in a market that is associated with a Gini co-efficient of 0.5. This 
is the first prediction that we will test in the next section. One can augment the framework to 
allow firm size advantages (scope economies) in the take up of opportunities, or violations of the 
Symmetry Principle. This induces more heterogeneity in firm size during market evolution and a 
resultant size distribution that is inside the limiting lower bound.  
The size of a firm within segments can differ due to differences across segments in the 
nature of short run price competition. The affect of introducing this additional dimension in 
measuring firm size is to introduce additional heterogeneity between firms in the market and so 
greater skewness. Thus, firm size distribution that allows for roles of different sizes will result in   6
a Lorenz curve that lies above that based on a pure count of roles across segments. This is the 
basic proposition in the theorem of majorisation (Marshall and Olkin, 1979).  We will test this 
second prediction by  allowing firm size within segments to depend on store coverage. 
Heterogeneity in shop coverage by firms within segments is predicted to push the size 
distribution further inside the bound
9.   
Finally, the size of roles, or firm size within segments, depends on the intensity of 
competition between brands of firms.  Hence, in the absence of very special conditions, not 
applicable to Carbonated Soft Drinks, there are no theoretical restrictions on the shape of role 
size distribution within segments.
10 The distribution of firms within segments can therefore be 
either very skewed or very equal. We test a third prediction, that irrespective of the nature of size 
distributions within segments, the heterogeneous coverage of segments by firms is predicted to 
generate a firm size distribution that will not violate the lower Bound.  
III Lorenz Curve Analysis Carbonated Soft Drinks 
The actual firm size distribution observed in the Carbonated Soft Drinks market is 
illustrated in Figure 1, averaged over the five-year period and for each bi-monthly period. This 
measures firm size as total firm sales in the business of Carbonated Soft Drinks, and plots the 
fraction of top k ranking firms in Carbonated Soft Drinks, k/N, against their corresponding 
market share in Carbonated Soft Drinks. N is the total number of firms and Ck describes the k-
firm sales concentration ratio in the market. For example, the top 25 per cent of firms collectively 
account for, on average, over 80 per cent of the market. We do not observe a violation of the 
predicted lower bound in our scatter of points in any bi-monthly period. The corresponding Gini 
co-efficient measure of inequality is 0.72, which clearly exceeds the mathematically predicted 
lower bound or a Gini co-efficient of 0.5.  
We first test the prediction that segmentation and heterogeneous participation of firms 
across segments dictates a lower bound to firm size distribution in a market. We analyse whether 
the presence of firms operating over vertical segments in Carbonated Soft Drinks places this 
lower bound on the shape of the firm size distribution. Each firm is given one mark for each 
segment it is active in. The size of the firm in the Carbonated Soft Drinks market is simply equal 
to the number of segments across which a firm operates. The percentage of segments (flavour, 
packaging, diet attributes) covered by firms ranges from 2 to 91 per cent, with a tendency for 
higher ranked firms to cover relatively more segments.  Figure 2 illustrates the size distribution 
of firms on the basis of a count of segments (flavour, packaging, diet attributes), within 
Carbonated Soft Drinks on average over the five-year period, and for each bi-monthly period.   7
The fit of the data to the theoretically predicted lower bound Lorenz Curve is remarkably tight 
for each and every period. Firm size inequality that is only driven by the heterogeneous 
operations of firms across vertical segments, corresponds to a Gini co-efficient of 0.56, and lies 
above the mathematically derived lower bound predicted in Sutton (1998).  
Secondly we test the prediction that when one allows for roles of different sizes, this will 
result in a Lorenz curve that lies above that based on a pure count of roles. A presence in each 
vertical segment is weighted by the percentage of stores retailing the firm’s brands within the 
segment.  The size of the firm is no longer a simple count of segments that a firm has a brand in 
but rather a count over fractions of these segments.  Figure 3 augments the Lorenz curve analysis 
to allow for the fact that having a partial coverage of shops within a segment can reduce the 
effective presence of a firm in a vertical segment. Thus, the effective operation of firms over 
vertical segments induces further heterogeneity in firm size and a Lorenz curve that is bowed 
further out from one based on a simple count of roles over vertical segments alone. This is 
evident in the Lorenz curve of figure 3, which corresponds to a Gini co-efficient of 0.69, on 
average.  
The above Lorenz curve analysis is based on measures of effective coverage that uses 
a pure count of stores. One can weight store coverage in terms of the size of the store in 
Carbonated Soft Drinks turnover. The count of stores covered weighted by the share of each 
store in Carbonated Drink sales reflects the fact that a firm may target distribution in bigger or 
smaller stores. Effective coverage of market segments ranges from 1 to 58 per cent. Figure 4 
is the Lorenz curve outcome when each role is weighted by the degree to which  firms 
effectively cover retail stores in the Carbonated Drinks Market, that is, the percentage of 
Carbonated Drink sales accounted for by the stores in which a firm is located or retails. 
Inequality in firm size that is driven by the heterogeneous effective operation of firms over 
vertical segments when coverage of stores reflect store size within segments corresponds to a 
Gini co-efficient of 0.70, on average. Changing the weighting to reflect effective coverage 
within segments leads to slightly more inequality. In both cases allowing for roles of different 
sizes results in a Lorenz curve that lies above that based on a pure count of roles.   
Inequality between firms based only on a count of roles over segments weighted by 
effective coverage of stores within segments provides evidence for Sutton’s (1998) theory. 
Allowing for firms to have different portfolios of stores within segments not only pushes the 
inequality in firm size distribution further inside the bound but the actual size distribution in 
Figure  1, with a corresponding Gini co-efficient of 0.72, is just slightly above the size   8
distribution based on a weighted (by effective store coverage within segments) count of roles 
across 40 vertical segments observed in Figure 4. Remarkably, product differentiation 
resulting from firms acquiring various portfolios of product attributes and stores in market 
evolution seems to determine most of the actual firm size distribution.  We supplement this 
Lorenz curve analysis with an econometric model of firm size and an econometric model of 
market share rivalry within segments over the next two sections of the paper. 
IV An Econometric Model of Firm Size  
We wish to evaluate the statistical significance of firm coverage of product segments and 
stores within these segments as a determinant of firm size in the business of Carbonated Soft 
Drinks. We construct our dependent and independent variables from information on 178 brands 
produced by 13 firms over 27 bi-monthly periods.  The dependent variable corresponds to the 
observed size level for firm f at a given point in time, t. We sum over the unit sales of the brands 
belonging to the firm to get firm size measured in unit sales of Carbonated Soft Drinks. Firm size 
depends on a number observable and unobservable factors. The basic model may be written as 
follows, 
  
ft f u ft CYCLE ft COVERAGE ft SIZE e b b a + + + + = ln 2 ln 1 ln
0
       (2)  
The variable COVERAGE controls for the percentage of vertical segments that the firm 
has at least one brand in the initial period of the data. We base our regressions on the basis of 
coverage over 40 segments. Persistent participation rates and a potential endogeneity problem 
induce us to use coverage in the initial period of the data. In addition, we use two measures of 
effective coverage where the presence in a vertical segment is weighted by either the percentage 
of stores retailing the firm’s brands within the segment, or the percentage of stores (weighted by 
size) retailing the firm’s brands within the segment in the initial periods. We also control for 
changes in the business cycle or seasonal effects with the variable CYCLE. This represents total 
product unit sales in the current period (excluding the firm’s sales), with higher values indicating 
boom periods. As an alternative, we also use a more refined measure of the business cycle with 
unit sales only of the vertical segments that a firm is in (excluding the firm’s sales), since the 
cyclicality of consumer demand can be very different for different vertical attributes. 
Unobserved heterogeneity between firms is controlled for by the inclusion of a unit 
specific residual, uf, which comprises of a collection of factors not in the regression that are firm 
specific and constant over time. For example, we have no data on advertising expenditures or   9
costs of production. Failure to acknowledge unobserved heterogeneity among cross-sectional 
units would inevitably result in biased estimates of the model. The factors that affect the value of 
the dependent variable but have not been explicitly included as independent variables are 
appropriately summarised by a random effect across cross-sectional units that is assumed to be 
independent of the other regressors. The use of a random effect model was justified on the basis 
of a Hausman (1978) test of independence of u f with the other regressors. We also use a 
Hausman specification test to see whether our model of firm size based on the presence of 40 
segments generates more efficiency and explanatory power than that created by repeating the 
same analysis either by 4 flavours or by 20 flavour by packaging segments.   
In Table 2 (a), (b) and (c) we present our econometric results. In Table 2 (a) we measure 
coverage as the percentage of the 40 vertical segments that the firm has at least one brand in the 
initial period of the data.  As the sole explanatory variable in Column I it explains 52 per cent of 
our observations on firm size using a simple OLS estimator. We build up the model with a 
measure of the business cycle based on unit sales of all Carbonated Soft Drinks and firm random 
effects, accepted on the basis of the Hausman Specification test. GLS estimates are presented in 
column III.  The presence of an auto-correlated error structure of order one in the GLS models 
led us to adopt a transformation of the data to obtain the unbiased estimates of the coefficients 
presented for the AR(1) in column IV. The cross-section variation in firm size is explained 
reasonably well by firm coverage of vertical segments, although the time series variation is not 
well explained using the business cycle of the market.  In the last three columns we repeat the 
exercise using a measure of the business cycle for firms with unit sales only of the vertical 
segments that a firm is in.  The overall, in addition to within and between, explanatory power 
improves to 0.66 per cent. Finally based on the regression in column VI we report Hausman 
specification tests to see whether we get efficiency gains from having 40 segments when 
compared to having 4 flavour or 20 flavour by packaging segments. The reported Hausman test, 
in both cases, accepts the null hypothesis that the difference in co-efficients between the two 
specifications is systematic. We have a better model of firm size allowing for heterogeneous 
operations over 40 segments rather than just 4 or 20 segments. 
In table 2 (b) we undertake exactly the same exercise as in table 2 (a), except we refine 
our measure of coverage of vertical segments in the initial period of the data to an effective 
measure that weights firm presence in a segment by the percentage of stores retailing the firm’s 
brands within the segment.  As the sole explanatory variable in Column I it explains 73 per cent 
of our observations on firm size using a simple OLS estimator.  In the last three columns using a   10
measure of the business cycle for firms with unit sales only of the vertical segments that a firm is 
in, the overall explanatory power is 0.78.   
In table 2 (c) we undertake exactly the same exercise, refining our measure of coverage 
further by weighting vertical coverage by the size weighted percentage of stores retailing the 
firm’s brands. As the sole explanatory variable in Column I it explains 75 per cent of our 
observations on firm size. In the last three columns using a measure of the business cycle for 
firms with unit sales of the vertical segments that a firm is in, the overall explanatory power 
increases to 0.81.   
In summary, a very simple model of firm size based on measures of effective coverage 
of vertical segments and segment business cycles as observable factors, controlling for 
unobservable firm effects, has remarkable explanatory power. As suggested by our Lorenz 
curve analysis the size of a firm based on its portfolios of product attributes and stores in 
market evolution determines most of the actual firm size distribution
11.  In the next section we 
understand how brand market share turbulence within segments do not lead to violations of 
the lower bound or indeed disturb the regularity in the firm size distribution in Carbonated 
Soft Drinks. This tests the final assertion of Sutton’s theoretically framework.  
V Within Segment Analysis of Carbonated Soft Drinks 
We wish to show that short-run brand market share rivalry is localised within our product 
segments, and within segment competition is augmented by the nature of store coverage by 
brands.  In other words that product differentiation on two dimensions determines the nature of 
competition between the 178 brands in Carbonated Soft Drinks. We validate the presence of 
segmentation by product characteristics applying Hausman, Leonard and  Zona (1994) and 
Hausman (1996). They use the idea of multi-stage budgeting to construct a multi-level demand 
system for differentiated products to evaluate the short-run impact of new brands
12. Our 
objective is to validate the presence of product segments and show that market share turbulence 
within these segments has second order effects on the overall size distribution. We wish to test 
whether we have weak separability of consumer preferences across the a priori segmentation of 
the market by our product attributes. As outlined in Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), weak 
separability of preferences is necessary and sufficient if in the last stage of multi-stage budgeting 
brand expenditure within segments depends more on segment real income (rather than aggregate 
business cycles) and the price of the other brands within the segment (rather than from brands 
hosted in other segments), amongst other factors. To calculate overall price elasticities using 
multi-stage budgeting requires much more structure and stricter forms of independence.    11
The precise form of the brand level expenditure function to be estimated in logs is written 
as the following,  
    lnESist= a0 + a1ln Sst + a2lnCist +a3lnPist + a4ln￿CjstPjst + a5Mt + a6 Ff + a7 Ss + Ui + åit          (3) 
The dependent variable measures brand  i expenditure share within one of the 40 
segments s of Carbonated Soft Drinks over a bi-monthly period. Sst is real segment income, 
measured by the total sales units of all brands in the segment.  Cist, is a store coverage variable 
for brand i, it measures the percentage of stores (weighted by store size) that a brand covers. Pist 
is the price of the brand, in Irish pounds, deflated using a paasche price index. The impact of 
other brand j prices in the segment is weighted by each brands horizontal distance from the 
market in terms of shop coverage, Cjst. The weighted average of other brands deflated prices in 
the Carbonates market is thus ￿CjstPjst.  A direct impact of store coverage, Cist , on brand market 
shares and its indirect effect through cross-price effects will indicate to us that horizontal product 
differentiation matters for market share rivalry. This is an outcome of brands hosting varying 
shop portfolios. We control for macro factors with month dummies, Mt, Firm dummies, Ff,, and 
segment dummies, S s, which controls for the possible influence of time, firm and segment 
effects. Unobserved heterogeneity between brands is controlled for by the inclusion of a unit 
specific residual, U i, which comprises of a collection of f actors not in the regression that are 
brand specific and constant over time. For example, we have no data on costs of production.  
Finally, åit is the unexplained component in the brand level expenditure function.  
In order to explore whether segments in v ertical attributes are present and brand 
competition is more localised in the relevant segments of the market we use the approach in 
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) to test for the presence of weak separability of consumer 
preferences across our segments. Equation 3 can be estimated with less segmentation reflected in 
the construction of real expenditure and average prices of other brands, and segment dummies. 
One constructs real expenditure on all brands in 20 flavour by packaging segments, 4 flavour 
segments, and in Carbonated Soft Drinks (zero segments). Likewise the weighted average of 
other brands prices could be averaged over less refined segmentation of the market. 
 Using Hausman specification tests we test whether the inclusion of real expenditure and 
the cross-price index defined for more refined 40 segments as additional regressors leads to 
efficiency gains in the estimation procedure. Firstly, as additional regressors, compared to when 
real expenditure and the cross-price index is defined at the product level assuming no segments, 
secondly for segment expenditure and segment cross-price effects that reflect 4 flavour 
segments, and finally that reflect 20 flavour by packaging segments. This is how we intend to   12
proceed to endogenously define the relevant vertical segments for clusters of brands within 
Carbonated Soft Drinks.  
The IV Model 
 In addition to the problem of identifying segments of the markets for differentiated 
products, there is the problem of multicollinearity of prices and the fact that segment real 
expenditure may be an outcome of multi-stage budgeting, leading to the need of a good 
instrument for each of them. The multicollinearity of prices is addressed by exploiting the panel 
structure of the underlying data. Allowing for firm and segment fixed effects, we instrument the 
price of a firms brand in a segment using the prices of a firm’ brands in other segments applying 
the econometric methodology of Hausman and Taylor (1981). The prices of a firms’ brands in 
other segments, after the elimination of segment and firm effects, are driven by common 
underlying costs correlated with brand price but are uncorrelated with the disturbances in the 
brand demand equations. Availability of panel data is crucial. We instrument real segment 
expenditure with aggregate (net of segment expenditure) real expenditure following Hausman, 
Leonard and Zona (1994). The need to instrument own-price and segment expenditure is tested 
using Hausman (1978) specification tests for instruments. 
Results 
The results of an OLS brand expenditure share regression within 40 segments are 
provided in the first column of Table 3. Due to some brand entry over-time the number of 
observations is 3159. Across segments, brand expenditure shares are significantly negatively 
related to real segment expenditures, or the size of the segment. Greater coverage of stores 
(weighted by size) in the first month t 0 enhances brand shares over bi-monthly periods. We 
observe that the estimated deflated own-price and the average deflated cross price of brands 
within the segment (weighted by store coverage) have, on average, a very significant negative 
and positive impact, respectively. The diagnostics on the residuals confirms that we find first-
order autoregressive residuals and heteroscedasticity in the residuals, reflecting omitted variables 
among other factors.   
Exploiting our panel on brands we allow for a brand random effect in residuals. The 
results of a GLS brand expenditure share regression within 40 segments, is provided in the 
second column of table 3. The results are largely similar in terms of observable explanatory 
variables but the effect of introducing unobservable brand specific effects reduces the first-order 
autoregressive process and heteroscedasticity in the residuals.    13
In column II we also report Hausman specification tests to see whether we get efficiency 
gains from the localised definitions of real expenditure and average prices, when compared to 
more aggregate measures of real expenditure and average prices of other brands across segments. 
The reported Hausman test, in all three cases, accepts the null hypothesis that the difference in 
co-efficients between the two specifications is systematic. To conclude, as in Hausman, Leonard 
and Zona (1994), we seem to have weak separability of preferences across our 40 attributes since 
we gain efficiency in our model of brand expenditure shares when we use real expenditures and 
price of the other brands defined for more refined segmentation of the market.  The presence of 
an auto-correlated  error structure of order one in the GLS models led us to adopt a 
transformation of the data to obtain the unbiased estimates of the coefficients presented for the 
AR(1) in column III which are largely the same as in column II. 
The results of a GLS brand expenditure share regression within 40 segments, 
instrumenting real segment expenditure with market expenditure (net of segment expenditure) 
and brand own price with the average price brands belonging to the same firm in other segments, 
are provided in column IV and, allowing for the presence of an auto-correlated error structure of 
order one in the IVGLS, column V of Table 3.  The results are largely similar, and the Hausman 
IV specification test accepts the null hypothesis that the difference in co-efficients between the 
two specifications is not systematic. It is possible that retail prices and segment expenditure can 
be quite exogenous with respect to current sales movements, due to weather or seasonal effects 
and to the nature of retail pricing (see Hausman, Leonard and Zona, 1994).   
Overall the short-run strategic interactions between brands are localised within vertical 
segments where competition is relaxed further within segments by various degrees of horizontal 
product differentiation.  
Firm ‘Role’ Size Distributions Within Segments of Carbonated Soft Drinks 
Our simple approach to modelling firm size distribution illustrates a structural feature 
that induces great stability in firm size distribution over the period examined, despite a high level 
of brand sale turbulence at a more micro level. The size of roles, or firm size within segments, 
depends on the intensity of competition between brands within segments. There are no 
theoretical restrictions on the shape of role size distribution within segments. Hence, the 
distribution of firms within segments can be either very skewed or very equal. This outcome is 
illustrated in Figure 5 for the 40 segments. This depicts the percentage of segment sales 
accounted for by the top k firms operating within that segment, ranked in ascending order of firm 
size within the segment. We observe a scatter of points that lie very close to the diagonal, and   14
other more skewed distributions within segments. The scatter of points jumps around from one 
bi-monthly period to another. The Gini co-efficient within each segment, averaged over the 
period, varies from almost perfect equality to 0.68. Competition between brands within 
segments, relaxed to various degrees by horizontal product differentiation, generate size 
distributions of firm sales within segments of various forms that change over-time. Compared to 
the overall firm size distribution, within vertical segments size distributions are more equal and 
in most cases violate the Sutton Bound. Yet, equality within segments does not induce aggregate 
equality at the level of Carbonated Drinks. Segmentation and heterogeneous participation of 
firms across vertical segments dictates a lower bound to firm size distribution in a market that is 
associated with a Gini co-efficient of 0.5.   
Short-run strategic interactions between brands are localised within vertical segments. 
Differences in store coverage, among other factors, results in firm sales (roles) within segments 
of different sizes. Further product differentiation within segments pushes the size distribution 
inside a bound based on a pure count of product attributes. Turbulence in brand market shares 
within these structural dimensions of the market can be great but does not disturb the regularity 
in the firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks. Remarkably, product differentiation, and 
not short-run brand competition, resulting from firms acquiring various portfolios of stores and 
product attributes in market evolution determines the limiting firm size distribution. Coca-Cola 
Company is ranked one in the Carbonated Soft Drinks retail market in Ireland over the period 
1992-1997, but its dominance does not result from its performance within vertical segments. 
Rather its success lies in the establishment of a portfolio of brands across most of the vertical 
segments, distributed effectively throughout retail stores. Small firms can co-exist with the 
multinationals by specialising into product segments with targeted distribution.  
Conclusion 
The presence of flavour, packaging and diet segments within Carbonated Soft Drinks 
provides an ideal setting to empirically examine the role of portfolio effects as a very simple 
way to model firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks. Heterogeneity in firm 
coverage of product attributes imposes Sutton’s (1998) mathematically predicted lower bound 
on the firm size distribution.  Allowing for further firm heterogeneity in store coverage within 
segments induces a firm size distribution that is inside the bound and very close to the actual 
firm size distribution in Carbonated Soft Drinks. In the history of the market firms accumulate 
various portfolios of product attributes and stores, dimensions of the Carbonated Soft Drinks 
market that determine the limiting firm size distribution.    15
Taking a b ottom-up approach we show that short-run strategic interactions between 
brands are localised within vertical segments and competition is relaxed further within segments 
by various degrees of imperfect shop coverage. We show that while individual segments h ost 
many forms of firm sales distributions, as an outcome of brand competition within segments, this 
does not lead to a violation Sutton’s lower bound or determine to a great extent the firm size 
distribution observed for Carbonated Soft Drinks.  
This has the short-run implication that mergers of firms with brands that cover different 
product segments would have a much greater impact on market share distributions than mergers 
between firms with brands in the same segments. Success in the Carbonated Soft Drinks is based 
on the establishment of an effective (good distribution across stores) portfolio of brands across 
most of the product attributes. Small firms co-exist by specialising into these dimensions. The 
issue for anti-trust is whether portfolios effects are an outcome of anti-competitive forces.  
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Table 1: Firm Roles and Brands in Segments of Carbonated Drinks Market, Oct.92-May 97 
Segments  Mean Size 
(£000) 











       
Regular Cola  2040  8.7  4  7 
Diet Cola  519  2.3  3  5 
Regular Orange  848  3.7  4  6 
Diet Orange  100  0.5  1  3 
Regular Lemonade  665  3.0  2  4 
Diet Lemonade  256  1.1  1  2 
Regular Mixed Fruit  988  4.3  6  8 
Diet Mixed Fruit  17  0.1  1  2 
Standard 
       
Regular Cola  1633  6.3  6  11 
Diet Cola  417  1.6  2  3 
Regular Orange  911  3.5  5  13 
Diet Orange  19  0.1  1  1 
Regular Lemonade  556  2.2  3  7 
Diet Lemonade  96  0.3  1  1 
Regular Mixed Fruit  3137  11.6  7  21 
Diet Mixed Fruit  19  0.1  1  1 
1.5 Ltr. 
       
Regular Cola  640  2.8  3  3 
Diet Cola  212  0.9  2  4 
Regular Orange  510  2.2  4  6 
Diet Orange  51  0.2  1  1 
Regular Lemonade  892  4.0  2  4 
Diet Lemonade  394  1.8  1  2 
Regular Mixed Fruit  447  1.9  6  7 
Diet Mixed Fruit  1  0.02  1  1 
2 Ltr. 
       
Regular Cola  1883  7.6  4  5 
Diet Cola  518  2.1  3  5 
Regular Orange  1320  5.6  4  5 
Diet Orange  136  0.6  2  3 
Regular Lemonade  1851  8.1  2  4 
Diet Lemonade  671  2.8  1  2 
Regular Mixed Fruit  2539  10.3  5  9 
Diet Mixed Fruit  21  0.1  1  1 
Multipack Cans 
       
Regular Cola  630  2.5  2  6 
Diet Cola  206  0.8  2  5 
Regular Orange  165  0.7  3  5 
Regular Lemonade  117  0.5  1  2 
Diet Lemonade  67  0.3  1  2 
Regular Mixed Fruit  6  0.05  1  1 
         
  24305  100  100  178 
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Table 2: Modelling Firm Size in Carbonated Drinks with 40 (Flavour by Packaging by 
Diet) Segments 
(i) All variables are in logs; (ii) * significant at the 5 per cent level; (iii) t-statistics in parentheses; 
(iv) GLS (a) refers to a random effects model and GLS (b) refers to a random effects model corrected for AR1 
(v) Market Cycle and Relevant Market Cycle are net of the firm’s sales. 
 
(a) Segment coverage based on a count of segments that a firm covers  
Firm Size  OLS   OLS I  GLS I 
    (a) 
GLS I 
(b) 


























     
Relevant Market 
Cycle 




















No. Obs.  268  268  268  268  268  268  268 
R2 Overall   0.52  0.53  0.50  0.51  0.62  0.62  0.62 
R2 Within      0.06  0.06    0.54  0.54 
R2 Between      0.57  0.58    0.63  0.63 
Hausman Test: 
Random Effects 
    c
2(1)= 0      c
2(1)=0.03   
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
20 flavourXpackage 





Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
4 flavour  
          c
2(2)= 1135 
prob>c





2(1)=119     c
2(1)=221  c
2(1)= 43   
Hetroskedasticity  c
2(1)= 99  c
2(2)=99   c
2(2)= 10   c
2(2)= 10   c
2(2)=144  c
2(2)= 10   c
2(2)= 10  
 
(b) Segment coverage based on a count of segments that a firm covers, weighted by firms 
percentage coverage of stores in a segment 
Firm Size  OLS   OLS I  GLS I 
    (a) 
GLS I 
(b) 


























     
Relevant Market 
Cycle 




















No. Obs.  268  268  268  268  268  268  268 
R2 Overall   0.73  0.73  0.71  0.72  0.77  0.76  0.76 
R2 Within      0.06  0.06    0.54  0.54 
R2 Between      0.81  0.81    0.80  0.81 
Hausman Test: 
Random Effects 
    c
2(1)=3.6      c
2(1)=2.7   
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
20 flavourXpackage 





Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
4 flavour  







2(1)=196   c
2(1)=119     c
2(1)=198   c
2(1)= 43   
Hetroskedasticity  c
2(2)= 51   c
2(2)= 51   c
2(2)= 5  c
2(2)= 8  c
2(2)= 56  c
2(2)= 16  c
2(2)= 16   20
(c) Segment coverage based on a count of vertical segments that a firm covers, weighted by 
firms effective coverage of stores (i.e. store share of carbonated soft drink sales) in a segment 
Firm Size  OLS   OLS I  GLS I 
    (a) 
GLS I 
(b) 


























     
Relevant Market 
Cycle 




















No. Obs.  268  268  268  268  268  268  268 
R2 Overall   0.75  0.74  0.73  0.74  0.80  0.79  0.80 
R2 Within      0.06  0.06    0.54  0.54 
R2 Between      0.84  0.85    0.85  0.86 
Hausman Test: 
Random Effects 
    c
2(1)=3.0      c
2(1)=2.1   
Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
20 flavourXpackage 





Hausman Test for 
Less Segmentation: 
4 flavour  








2(1)=109     c
2(1)=196   c
2(1)=38    
Hetroskedasticity  c
2(1)= 45   c
2(2)= 48   c
2(2)= 5   c
2(2)=  5   c
2(2)= 45   c
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Table 3: Modelling Brand Competition in Carbonated Drinks with 40 (Flavour by 
Packaging by Diet) Segments 
(i) All variables are in logs; (ii) * significant at the 5 per cent level; (iii) t -statistics in parentheses;                    
(iv) GLS (a) refers to a random effects model and GLS (b) refers to a random effects model, with own price 
instrumented using a size weighted average price of a firms’ brands in other segments, and segment size 
instrumented using real expenditure on all other segments. (v) initial weighted store coverage is the percentage 
of total carbonated sales that the stores covered by a brand account for; (vi) own price is paasch brand price; (vii) 
cross-price is a weighted (by store specialisation) average price of all other brands within a segment  

















































No. Obs.  3159  3159  3111  3111 
R2 Overall   0.54  0.51  0.33  0.48 
R2 Within    0.21  0.06  0.20 
R2 Between    0.69  0.59  0.66 
Hausman Test: Random 
Effects 
  c2(27)= 0 
prob>c2=1 
   
Hausman Specification Test 
for less segmentation:           
Flavour by Packaging Only 
  c2(71)=264
prob>c2= 0 
   
Hausman Specification Test 




   
Hausman Specification Test 




   
Hausman Test: 
Instrumenting  
    c2(68) = 20 
prob>c2= 1.0 
 
AR1  c2(1)=262  c2(1) = 99  c2(1) = 95   
Hetroskedasticity  c2(71)=210  c2(71)= 64  c2(68)= 69   
Firm, Segment, and Month 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Figure 1: Actual Firm Size Distribution in the Irish Carbonated Soft Drinks 
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Figure 2: Firm Size Distribution Based on a Count of Roles over 40 Segments (Flavour by 
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Figure 3: Firm Size Distribution Based on a Count of Roles, Weighted by Firm Coverage of 
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Figure 4: Firm Size Distribution Based on a Count of Roles, Weighted by Firm Effective 
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Figure 5: Actual Firm Size Distributions Within 40 (Flavour by Packaging by Diet) Segments in 
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Endnotes 
 
1.  For a comprehensive review of this literature on firm size distributions, the reader is referred to 
Sutton [1997]. Gibrat [1931], using the mathematics of “stochastic processes”, postulates that the 
size-growth relationship for active firms generates size distributions approximately lognormal in 
form. Hart and Prais (1956) and Iijri and Simon (1964,1977) build in a stochastic entry process 
around Gibrats size growth relationship for active firms. Unfortunately, simple generalisations on 
the form of firm size distributions, as outcomes of a historical stochastic processes, do not 
describe firm size distributions observed across the general run of industries.  
Another strand of literature beginning with Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), using rich 
firm level data, suggest that the relationship between firm growth and firm characteristics, 
including size and age, is much more complex. Indeed theorists, such as Jovanovic (1982), tried 
to give the size-growth relationship an economic foundation and found the relationship to be 
sensitive to the details of modelling. In general, the vast volume of empirical studies testing 
growth, size and age relationships seem to agree that Gibrat’s law fails and points to the success 
of idiosyncratic firm and sector characteristics. It seems that no general predictions can be made 
from short run dynamics on the form of limiting size distributions. This paper clearly 
demonstrates the nature of the relationship between short run dynamics and long-run size 
distributions in the retail market of Carbonated Soft Drinks. 
2 Sutton (1998) marries the approach taken in Iijri and Simon (1964,1977) with the game 
theoretic approach used in Sutton (1991).  In Sutton (1991), in the Bain [1951] tradition, stage 
games motivated differences in the lower bound to firm concentration that can be expected to 
exist across advertising and non-advertising branches of 4-5 digit food and drink products. In 
Sutton (1998) motivates a lower bound to firm size distribution that is modelled as an outcome of 
a sequence of deterministic entry stage-games across segments/investment opportunities during 
market evolution. Deterministic entry games replace the stochastic entry processes of Iijri and 
Simon (1964,1977). 
3 Sutton (1998) in Part I of the book shows how the nature of tastes and technology within an 
industry puts a joint restriction on endogenous sunk cost outlays and the size and numbers of 
segments that evolve in the history of the industry. In the context of Carbonated Soft Drinks if 
consumers were fully mobile across segments and advertising was very effective the market 
would evolve to be dominated by one segment. Tastes structures and advertising outlays, 
amongst other factors, have driven the degree of segmentation by product attribute documented 
in Table 1.   
4 Transportation costs ensure that a firm has to have a production location in a state to serve the 
local market.  
5 To have a presence in a segment, a company must have at least one brand in a defined flavour, 
packaging and diet segment. 
6 Retail sales data are fundamentally different to company accounts data for these firms, and 
have a number of advantages for our analysis. With company accounts data it may be hard to 
disentangle produce for export from that for national consumption. Company accounts data may 
consist of both intermediate and final goods. Finally, company accounts data can encompass a 
range of products that are not even closely related on the demand side of the market.   28
 
7 The introduction of foreign competition into the chain store market, which induced structural 
upheaval in the market, did not take place until the end of 1998. Both international and national 
companies distributed their brands throughout a retail structure that was very stable through the 
period analysed in this paper. 
8 The Symmetry Principle is based on the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) concept of symmetry and 
subgame consistency.  
9 The importance of controlling for the coverage of a firm, in terms of their distribution through a 
subset of stores, and the effective coverage of a firm, in terms of the size of stores within the 
product sales, is illustrated in Walsh and Whelan (1999b). Specialisation of distribution through 
a subset of stores can relax competition within a product market.  
10. Only under the special conditions of very weak competition and overlapping of niches can 
theory predict the shape that the size distribution within niches must take. In this special case 
game theoretic analysis predicts an extremely fragmented outcome so that the Lorenz Curve for 
each niche must lie close to the diagonal [for an illustration, see Sutton 1998, Chapter 12] 
11 The entry games that took place in the history of the industry clearly determined the 
equilibrium configuration of product attributes and stores that we observe each firm holding at 
this stage of industry maturity. We take this as an important structural feature that disciplines 
firm size and localised brand competition over the short time span that we study the industry. 
Clearly such structural features are endogenous to the nature of industry evolution.  Sutton 
(1998) with case studies of industries and Klepper and Simons (2000) with long time series data 
document the factors that determined how industries have evolved to endpoint structures. 
12 The basic problem in estimating demand for differentiated products is the dimensionality 
problem. A linear demand system for n brands has n
2 price parameters to estimate. They apply 
the multi-stage budgeting structure to a three-stage demand system. The objective is to estimate 
all three levels of demand and combine the estimates to calculate the overall own and cross price 
elasticities for each brand. The discrete choice literature, in a random coefficient model, shows 
one how to calculate the cross-price elasticities between all pairs reducing the dimensionality 
space into a product space, see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). Our objective in this paper is 
more modest. We just want a simple test of market segmentation using the final stage of multi-
stage budgeting used by Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994). The main focus of the paper is on 
the imperfect and varying effective coverage of vertical segments by firms as a key 
determination of the firm size distribution. The main objective of this section of the paper is to 
show that the nature of localised competition between the brands within segments is consistent 
with the main focus of the paper.        